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Abstract
We depart from existing literature by invoking analysts’ forecasts to measure banking
system opacity and then investigate the impact of such opacity on bank risk-taking,
using a large panel of US bank holding companies, over the 1995–2013 period. We un-
cover three new results. Firstly, we find that opacity increases insolvency risks among
banks. Secondly, we establish that the relationship between opacity and bank risk-
taking is accentuated by the degree of banking market competition. Thirdly, we show
that the bank business model moderates the risk-taking incentives of opaque banks,
albeit only marginally. Overall, these findings suggest that the analysts’ forecast
measure of bank opacity is useful for understanding risk-taking by publicly-traded
banks, with important implications for bank stability.
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1. Introduction
Banks are inherently opaque and, according to Blau et al. (2017), they are more
opaque than other types of firms. Indeed, the age-old problem of bank opacity is well
acknowledged in the theory, practice and regulation of banking. For example, bank
regulators have called for more transparency and market discipline as part of the
important policy initiatives towards Basel III (Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision, 2013; Horváth and Vaško, 2016). Increased sophistication in bank business
models has also heightened the problem of bank opacity (Morgan, 2002; Flannery
et al., 2013), in the intermediation role that banks play as providers of liquidity
(Diamond, 1984) and delegated monitors (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). To the ex-
tent that opacity is associated with inefficient market discipline (Demsetz and Lehn,
1985; Cordella and Yeyati, 1998; Boot and Schmeits, 2000), its prevalence theoret-
ically creates distorted risk-taking incentives. The existing evidence, whilst equivo-
cally in support of the theoretical predictions, focuses on country-level transparency
measures (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008; Bushman and Williams, 2012; Horváth and
Vaško, 2016) and accounting-based disclosure indicators (Nier, 2005; Nier and Bau-
mann, 2006). The natural question, at this point, is whether more direct measures of
opacity, particularly those used by practitioners, support the theoretical predictions.
In this paper, we examine empirically the effect of opacity on overall bank sta-
bility. We depart from the existing literature by using, as alternative measures of
opacity, analysts’ forecast errors and dispersions, which are highly informative mea-
sures that emphasise the precision of both private and public information. We further
investigate the extent to which the interaction between opacity and bank stability
is conditional on banking competition and bank business model. We also consider
the implications of opacity for the competition-stability nexus and the relationship
between bank business model and risk-taking in banking.
Our empirical results suggest that, firstly, a high degree of opacity impairs bank
stability. This effect is present even after controlling for observable and unobserv-
able bank characteristics, and the possible endogeneity problems that may plague
this relationship. Secondly, the impact of opacity on banking stability is higher for
bank-year periods of optimism than those of pessimism. Thirdly, opacity is more
destabilising in the periods prior to and during the 2007-08 global financial crisis
but not statistically robustly so post-crisis. Fourthly,the negative effect of opacity
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on bank stability is accentuated by a higher degree of banking competition. Equiva-
lently, whilst a higher degree of banking competition is found to be associated with
a less stable banking system, the effect is larger for highly opaque banks. Finally,
we find that the effect of opacity on bank risk-taking is conditional on bank business
models. Specifically, higher dependence on non-deposit (wholesale) funding increases
the risk-taking behaviour of opaque banks, whilst diversification, in contrast, has a
weak moderating effect. The finding suggests that banks with highly diversified busi-
ness models have an incentive to maintain a high level of transparency and relatively
high risk-aversion.
The paper makes three main new contributions to the literature. Firstly, and to
the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to relate opacity derived from ana-
lysts’ earnings forecasts to bank stability. Analysts are regarded as informed interme-
diaries between organisations and investors (O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Chung and
Jo, 1996), and their forecast properties have first-order causality on market liquidity
(Roulstone, 2003). Hence, analysts’ forecast activities provide a primary source of
information to security investors. For instance, Roulstone (2003) finds that analysts’
forecast dispersion reduces bid-ask spread, share depth and the adverse selection
component of bid-ask spread. Another interesting feature of analysts’ forecast ac-
tivities as argued in Chung and Jo (1996) is that they have direct monitoring effects
on organisations in the sense of Jensen and Meckling (1976). Also, using analysts’
forecast inaccuracy allows us to disentangle the effects of optimism and pessimism
on bank stability.
Secondly, our paper pulls together the literature on banking competition and
opacity to explain the risk-taking behaviour of banks. Although these strands of
the existing literature have long-standing strong theoretical interactions, our paper,
to the best of our knowledge, is the first to study their joint effects on bank risk-
taking using a direct measure of competition estimated at the bank level. By doing
so, the paper helps to address some potential regulatory and supervisory concerns
about whether, and to what extent, banking competition could be allowed to soften
bank disclosure requirements. In other words, we shed light on whether there is an
optimal level of competition at which opacity is less costly in banking. This question
is crucial in the sense that both monitoring and bank failure can be extremely costly
(Verrecchia, 1983; Bushman and Williams, 2012).
Thirdly, the paper sheds light on the complex interactions between bank busi-
ness models and risk-taking. Evidence of significant interactions between opacity
and diversification should have significant policy implications given that reliance on
non-interest earnings income accounts for a sizeable proportion of US bank holding
companies’ total income, rising from about 32% in 1990 to 42% in 2004 (Stiroh, 2006),
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whilst opacity amongst US bank holding companies is significantly high (Flannery
et al., 2013).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the
relevant literature. Section 3 discusses the empirical estimation methods. Section
4 describes the data and variables used for the study. The empirical results are
presented in Section 5, whilst Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
Past studies have examined the interaction of country-level transparency mea-
sures, accounting disclosures, stock liquidity and risk-taking. Other strands of the
literature examine competition and business model channels of bank risk-taking. In
this section, we draw on these studies and existing theory to develop specific hypothe-
ses. Specifically, we develop hypotheses relating to: (i) bank opacity and risk-taking;
(ii) the moderating effect of competition on the nexus between bank opacity and risk-
taking; and (iii) the moderating effect of bank business models on the relationship
between bank opacity and risk-taking.
2.1. Bank opacity and risk-taking
Traditionally, bank assets are known to be relatively highly opaque (Morgan,
2002; Flannery et al., 2013), a situation which raises concerns about the effectiveness
of market discipline and risk-taking. Theory predicts that opacity in banking impacts
bank risk-taking incentives. This argument stems from the fact that, in equilibrium,
more opaque banks face higher funding cost and higher risk-taking becomes their
optimal choice.
It is argued that banks’ funding cost is an increasing function of the extent of
observability of their monitoring efforts or risk choices (Cordella and Yeyati, 1998;
Boot and Schmeits, 2000; Nier, 2005). The required rates of return on deposits and
investments in the banks are chosen to commensurate with the observed monitoring
efforts. By providing more information to help the market observe monitoring efforts
or risk choices, the banks are inherently electing to subject themselves to greater
market discipline and commit to low risk-taking incentives. Consequently, a bank
failing to provide information attracts the highest funding cost as its optimal strategy
is assumed to be maximum risk-taking. Further, as transparency offers a yardstick to
measure a bank’s monitoring effort (Boot and Schmeits, 2000), opacity would create
an incentive for the bank to commit to lower monitoring as monitoring efforts can
be costly (Nier, 2005). Thus, theoretically, opacity increases bank risk-taking.
The existing evidence is equivocal on what really drives bank risk-taking be-
haviour. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008) and Bushman and Williams (2012) find that
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country-level transparency measures improve bank soundness. Nier (2005) and Nier
and Baumann (2006) find similar results using accounting-based disclosure indica-
tors. Further, Vallascas and Keasey (2013) find that liquidity-based transparency
measures reduce banks’ default risk.
Clearly, the observed evidence is based mainly on measures of opacity derived
from country-level and accounting disclosures on the one hand, and liquidity on
the other. However, country-level disclosures fail to capture the heterogeneity in
opacity across banks and over time, whilst accounting-based measures have little
or no within-sample variation, implying that these disclosure indices capture the
quantity rather than the quality of information disclosure at best (e.g., Vallascas
and Keasey, 2013). Also, liquidity measures of opacity, to a large extent, capture
uncertainty rather than the precision of information in the market. Based on the
foregoing argument and the related evidence, we formulate our first hypothesis as:
Hypothesis 1: Opacity increases risk-taking behaviour among banks.
2.2. Bank opacity and risk-taking: the moderating effect of competition
It is argued that the extent to which opacity drives banks to take high levels of
risk is conditional on banking market competition or their charter value (Cordella
and Yeyati, 1998). Intuitively, the expected loss to a bank arising from risk-taking
is larger if the bank has a higher charter value. The higher expected loss should
reduce the risk-taking incentives of opaque banks. This argument is consistent with
the strand of literature which suggests that intense banking competition decreases
market power and profit margins and consequently increases risk-taking incentives
(Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990; Boot and Thakor, 1993; Hellmann et al., 2000; Allen
and Gale, 2004; Beck et al., 2013). This competition-fragility hypothesis can reinforce
the opacity-driven risk-taking behaviour.
Another strand of the literature argues, at the same time, that banks in more
competitive markets are less inclined to disclose information due to higher propri-
etary costs (Verrecchia, 1983, 1990; Clinch and Verrecchia, 1997) and have lower
borrower-specific information (Marquez, 2002; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). For
instance, evidence from non-financial firms suggests that analysts’ forecasts have less
dispersion and are more accurate when market power is high (Gaspar and Massa,
2006; Datta et al., 2011; Haw et al., 2015). This competition-opacity hypothesis
suggests a need for greater market discipline, suggesting further that a more intense
banking competition leads to a higher marginal effect of opacity.
Based on the foregoing discussion of the relevant theoretical and empirical liter-
ature, we formulate the bank competition-opacity-fragility hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 2: The marginal effect of opacity on bank risk-taking increases with
banking competition
However, recent developments suggest, contrary to the above, that banking mar-
ket competition reduces the effect of opacity on bank risk-taking. It is argued that
lower competition can lead to more risk-taking as banks charge higher interest rates
(Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005), which result in poor loan portfolios. Also, higher
risk-taking incentives can result from the exploitation of the “too-big-to-fail” sta-
tus banks acquire under less competitive environments (Kane, 2010; Acharya et al.,
2013). Further, the entry deterrence argument (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Wa-
genhofer, 1990) suggests that competition would lead incumbent banks to disclose
more information; the disclosure of bad news should deter potential entrants, whilst
positive information should enhance market expectations. Some empirical evidence
for non-financial firms is provided by Botosan and Stanford (2005) and Ali et al.
(2014).
Moreover, by improving the quality of corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny,
1997), discouraging discretionary earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003), and en-
abling peer benchmarking and improving the information environment (Holmstrom,
1982), competition should reduce the risk-taking incentives. Effectively, competition
should moderate the risk-taking incentives of opaque banks.
Based on the foregoing arguments, we formulate our alternate hypothesis (that
is, our competition-transparency-fragility hypothesis) as follows:
Hypothesis 3: The marginal effect of opacity on bank risk-taking decreases with
banking competition
With such a mixed, yet rich, theoretical underpinning, the dependence of the
effectiveness of market discipline on heterogeneity in bank competition deserves some
empirical attention; the empirical literature largely ignores this interaction role of
competition in the opacity–risk-taking relationship.1
2.3. Bank opacity and risk-taking: the moderating effect of bank business model
Bank business models have experienced significant levels of sophistication and
have also assumed a trend towards increased revenue diversification, with implica-
tions for opacity and its relationship with risk-taking. Highly diversified banks may
1Nier and Baumann (2006) provide indirect support for this hypothesis by showing that trans-
parency is associated with higher bank capital and that the effect is higher for banks in countries
with a higher indicator of entry restriction. However, this proxy fails to capture competition at the
bank level. Further, their focus is on bank capital, not on overall bank risk-taking or solvency.
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be more opaque than their less diversified counterparts because earnings generated
from different sources are less predictable than earnings generated from a largely
single source. However, if segment earnings forecasts are imperfectly correlated,
then opacity may be expected (Thomas, 2002). Also, revenue diversification could
impact the opacity-risk-taking relationship via its direct effect on bank risk-taking
or stability. For instance, several recent studies find that revenue diversification is
associated with higher risk (e.g., DeYoung et al., 2004; Stiroh, 2004a,b, 2006). If
opacity increases with diversification, or risk-taking increases with diversification,
the marginal effect of opacity on bank risk-taking should be accentuated for highly
diversified banks. However, the marginal effect of opacity on bank risk-taking should
be limited for diversified banks if diversification reduces opacity, or if diversification
decreases risk-taking.
On bank deposit structure, banks that rely on non-deposit funding are subject
to close monitoring (Calomiris, 1999), suggesting that these banks face higher mar-
ket discipline. For instance, King (2008) suggests that relatively riskier banks pay
relatively higher rates on their inter-bank borrowings. Unsurprisingly, Dinger and
Von Hagen (2009) find that banks with significant interbank borrowings take less
risk. This argument suggests, therefore, that the marginal effect of opacity can be
expected to be lower for banks that focus on non-deposit funding.
The above argument, however, does not consider the alternate arguments sug-
gesting that non-deposit funding may not be an effective monitoring device due to its
extremely short maturity (Rochet and Tirole, 1996). Further, non-deposit funding
could be relatively less stable (Song and Thakor, 2007) and more likely to lead to
inefficient liquidation in a costless, noisy information environment (e.g., Huang and
Ratnovski, 2011). This argument suggests a possible higher marginal effect of opac-
ity for banks that depend more on non-deposit funding. Hence, the interaction effect
of opacity and deposit funding on bank risk-taking remains an empirical question.
Based on the forgoing argument, we formulate our fourth hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 4: Bank business model moderates the marginal effect of opacity on
bank risk-taking
3. Empirical methodology
Our discussion in the preceding section conditions bank risk-taking on bank-
specific opacity, competition and bank business model. Taking guidance from this
and controlling for other variables as in Beck et al. (2013), we model bank risk-
taking as a function of bank-level opacity (derived from analysts’ forecast error and
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dispersion), competition and bank business model. We, therefore, formulate our
econometric model as follows:
ln(Riskit) = α + β1Opacityit + β2Competitionit +
2∑
k=1
γkBusinessk,it
+
4∑
m=1
φmControlsm,it + it (1)
where Risk, Opacity, Competition, Business and Controls are respective proxies
for bank risk, opacity, competition, business model and control variables, all of which
are as defined in Section 4; β, γ, φ and θ are parameters; k denote the number of
business model variables, ranging from 1 to 2; m is the number of control variables,
ranging from 1 to 4; and  is the error term, which is assumed to be mean zero and
unit variance.
In order to account for the non-linearity in the effects on bank risk-taking of
opacity, competition and business model, we reformulate Eq. (1) as follows:
ln(Riskit) = α + β1Opacityit + β2Competitionit +
2∑
k=1
γkBusinessk,it
+
(
θCompetitionit +
2∑
k=1
ηkBusinessk,it
)
×Opacityit
+
4∑
m=1
φmControlsm,it + it (2)
We then derive the marginal effects of opacity and competition by differentiating
Eq. (2) with respect to Opacity and Competition, respectively, as follows:
∂ (ln(Riskit))
∂ (Opacityit)
= β1 + θCompetitioni,t +
2∑
k=1
ηkBusinessk,it (3)
and
∂ (ln(Riskit))
∂ (Competitioni,t)
= β2 + θOpacityi,t (4)
Likewise, the marginal effect of business model is derived by differentiating Eq. (2)
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with respect to business model as follows:
∂ (ln(Riskit))
∂ (Businessk,it)
= γk + ηkOpacityit, k = 1, 2. (5)
4. Measurement and data
4.1. Measuring bank risk-taking
In this paper, we use mainly Z-score as our inverse measure of risk-taking. Z-score
is a popular measure of bank soundness or solvency in the banking literature (e.g.,
Lepetit and Strobel, 2013; Chu, 2015; Köhler, 2015; Mergaerts and Vennet, 2016;
Mollah et al., 2017). It measures the number of standard deviations by which profit
has to fall for a bank to go bankrupt. Hence, it can be interpreted as a measure of
distance to default (Mollah et al., 2017). For any given bank, the Z-score increases
with the levels of profitability and capitalisation, but decreases with the volatility
of profits. Following Lepetit and Strobel (2013) and Köhler (2015), we compute
bank-specific and time-varying Z-score as follows:
Z−scoreit = ROAit + CARit
σp(ROA)
(6)
where ROAit is the return on assets of bank i at time t, proxied by the ratio of net
income to total assets; CARit is the ratio of total equity to total assets of bank i at
time t; and σp(ROA) is the standard deviation of return on assets of bank i over the
sample period. We use other measures of risk or stability in our empirical analysis
for robustness checks. First, we follow Köhler (2015) and decompose our Z−score
into risk-adjusted profits and risk-adjusted capital, respectively, as follows:
ZROAit =
ROAit
σp(ROA)
(7)
ZCARit =
CARit
σp(ROA)
(8)
Next, we use the market model to derive systematic and idiosyncratic risks for
each bank in each period. Specifically, for each bank we estimate the following model:
rit = α + βrmit + it (9)
where rit is the daily return on the stock of bank i and rmit is the CRSP value-
weighted daily return. Consistent with previous literature (e.g., Pathan, 2009), for
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each bank i at time t we proxy systematic risk (SY SRit) with β, idiosyncratic risk
(IDIORit) with the annual standard deviation of it and, finally, total risk (TRit)
with the annual standard deviation of daily stock returns.
4.2. Measuring opacity
We describe in this section how we construct our measures of opacity. Previous
literature (e.g., Flannery et al., 2004; Anolli et al., 2014) has used analysts’ forecast
errors and forecast dispersions as a measure of opacity to address different questions.
Accordingly, we use these proxies as our measures of opacity in this study. We
take care to ensure that we keep only the most recent earnings forecast for each
analyst who provides more than one forecast. Also, to ensure that actual and forecast
earnings per share are based on the same number of shares outstanding, we follow
the approach in Robinson and Glushkov (2006) and adjust earnings forecast using
the CRSP cumulative adjustment factor.
Specifically, we measure analysts’ forecast error as the absolute value of the dif-
ference between mean analysts’ forecasts and actual earnings per share scaled by
the share price at the end of the period. Specifically, we compute analysts’ forecast
errors as below:
Forecast errorit =
∣∣∣∣FEPSit − AEPSitPriceit
∣∣∣∣ (10)
where FEPSit is the average of all earnings forecasts for bank i in fiscal year t;
AEPSit is the actual earnings per share for bank i in fiscal year t; and Priceit is the
share price of bank i at the end of fiscal year t.
Next, we measure dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts as the standard devi-
ation of analysts’ forecasts for the fiscal year scaled by the share price at the end of
the year.
4.3. Measuring competition
Several measures of competition have been employed in the banking literature.
These include the Lerner index, Panzar-Ross H-statistics, Boone indicator and struc-
tural measures, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). However, the Lerner
index is the only measure of competition that varies at the bank level; the remain-
ing measures are best suited for measuring cross-country differences in competition.
Hence, we use the Lerner index as our measure of competition in this paper.
The Lerner index captures the extent to which banks are able to exercise market
power by charging a higher price above marginal cost. Hence, higher values of the
index are consistent with lower competition, and vice versa. It can be computed as
follows:
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Lernerit =
Pit −MCit
Pit
. (11)
where Pit refers to price of total assets of bank i at time t, proxied by the ratio of
total revenue to total assets; and MCit refers to the marginal cost of bank i at time
t.
Since marginal cost is not directly observable, we follow previous literature (An-
drievskaya and Semenova, 2016; Ariss, 2010; Beck et al., 2013; Fernández et al., 2013)
and derive it from a translog cost function (TCF) as in Eq. (12).
lnCit = α + β1lnQit + β2lnQ2it +
3∑
k=1
δklnWk,it +
3∑
k=1
3∑
s=1
φk,slnWk,itlnWs,it
+
3∑
k=1
γklnQitlnWk,it + λt + it (12)
where Cit refers to the total cost of bank i at time t; lnQit refers to output, proxied
by total assets, of bank i at time t; and lnWk,it is input prices of labour (k = 1),
capital (k = 2) and funding (k = 3) for bank i at time t. We apply symmetry and
homogeneity of degree one in input prices by scaling the total cost (C) and the price
of inputs by the input price of funds. The marginal costs are obtained from Eq. (12)
as follows:
MCit =
Cit
Qit
(
β1 + 2β2lnQit +
3∑
k=1
γklnWk,it
)
. (13)
4.4. Measuring business model
We describe in this section how we construct our measures of bank business
model. We follow Köhler (2015) and Mergaerts and Vennet (2016) and proxy bank
business model with funding structure and income diversification. Funding structure
(Non-depositit) is the ratio of non-deposit funding to total funding. Income structure
(Non-interestit) is the ratio of non-interest income to total income.
4.5. Control variables
The econometric models which we specify later in this paper control for other
bank-specific variables, including credit risk, size and growth (e.g., Beck et al., 2013;
Fosu, 2014; Mergaerts and Vennet, 2016), constructed for each bank i at time t.
Credit risk (Provisionsit) is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. Bank size
(Sizeit) is the natural logarithm of each bank’s total assets. Finally, asset growth
(Growthit) is the annual growth rate of assets. The control variables are further
defined in Table 1.
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4.6. Data
Consolidated balance sheet and income statement data are obtained from the
FRY-9C quarterly reports filed with the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Market
data for bank holding companies is obtained from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) database. These sets of data are then linked using the CRSP-FRB link
table from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.2 We further link the resulting
data to analysts’ forecast and actual earnings per share data obtained from the
detailed history file of the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). We
then retain the fourth quarter data for bank holding companies for which we could
obtain matches across the aforementioned databases.
By following the approach described above, we are able to obtain an initial sample
size of 744 bank holding companies. We apply the following exclusion criteria. First,
we exclude bank-year observations with negative values of interest and non-interest
income and stock price, as they can introduce noise and lead to spurious associations.
Finally, we require each bank holding company to have at least three consecutive
years of observation to permit robust estimation. The final sample that meets these
criteria consists of 402 bank holding companies over the period 1995–2013.
A detailed list of variables used in the study is provided in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
4.7. Summary statistics and correlation matrix
We present the descriptive statistics of the variables for our empirical analysis in
Table 2.The mean value of the inverse measure of risk-taking is 33.69, suggesting that
profit will have to fall about 33 times before the average bank defaults. This variable
exhibits a high level of variability represented by a standard deviation of 52.86, which
is about one and a half times the mean Z-score. This variable rises from a minimum
of 0.011 to a maximum of 1402.92, suggesting a high degree of heterogeneity across
banks. The average value of risk-adjusted profit is 3.37, whilst that for risk-adjusted
capital is 30.32, suggesting that the stability of US bank holding companies largely
stems from capitalisation. Both of these variables exhibit a significant amount of
variability as well. Referring to the market measures of risk, the mean values of total
risk, idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk are respectively 8.2%, 7% and 0.74. These
variables exhibit moderate levels of variability.
2Available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html,
accessed on 31 March 2016.
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[Table 2 about here.]
The mean value of our two measures of opacity, analysts’ forecast error and
the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts, are, respectively, 1.25 and 0.93; these variables
have standard deviations of 2.296 and 1.415, respectively, implying a high degree of
variability. The maximum values of these variables are, respectively, 9.44 and 5.62,
whilst the minimum values are close to zero, suggesting a fair degree of heterogeneity.
Our inverse measure of competition has a mean value of 0.27 and a standard devi-
ation of 0.08. The means of the proportions of non-deposit funding and non-interest
income are, respectively, 0.183 and 0.802. These suggest that non-deposit funding
represents about 18.3% of total funding, whilst non-interest income represents 80.2%
of total income of the average US bank holding company.
Further, the mean value of provision for loan losses is about 0.6% of total loans
outstanding. Total loans account for about 65% of the average bank holding com-
pany’s assets, which records an annual growth rate of about 10%. Equity capital
stands at 9.2% of total assets, on average. These variables, including bank size and
market-to-book ratio, exhibit moderate levels of heterogeneity.
Table 3 displays the correlation between the estimation variables. As expected,
Z-score is highly correlated with all of its components and negatively correlated with
the market measures of risk. Also, the analysts’ forecast error and dispersions are
negatively correlated with the Z-score, risk-adjusted profit and risk-adjusted capi-
tal, but positively correlated with total risk, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk.
This correlation suggests a positive (but not necessarily causal) relationship between
opacity and bank risk-taking. Table 3 further suggests a negative correlation be-
tween market power and risk-taking. Moreover, the correlation between non-deposit
funding and non-interest income on the one hand, and risk-taking on the other hand
is negative.
[Table 3 about here.]
Overall, the univariate descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlations suggest
that our data and sample periods appear not to be plagued by any serious data
issues, such as large outliers and limited variations.
We further probe the relationship between opacity and risk-taking by plotting
detrended opacity (based on analysts’ forecasting error and dispersion) against de-
trended risk-taking (based on the Z-score). The scatter plots and the lines of best fit
in Figures 1 and 2 suggest a negative relation between bank opacity and risk-taking.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
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5. Estimation and testing results
In this section, we present the main empirical results for Eqs. (1)–(2). We use a
panel data approach with bank and year fixed effect in all estimations. We follow this
up with a series of robustness checks, including the marginal effect analysis derived
from Eqs. (3)–(5).
5.1. Information, competition, business model and risk-taking
Table 4 presents the empirical results for Eq. (1) testing the effects of opacity
and competition on bank risk-taking. Analysts’ forecast error is used as the measure
of opacity in Models 1–4, whilst forecast dispersion is used in Models 6–8.
[Table 4 about here.]
We start our analysis with Models 1 and 5, where bank risk-taking is explained by
opacity only. In both models, the coefficient on opacity is negative and statistically
significant at the 1% level, which provides support for Hypothesis 1 that bank opacity
increases risk-taking. We extend these models by including traditional determinants
of bank risk-taking, namely loan loss provisions, bank size, loans and asset growth,
as in Models 2 and 6. We further control for competition in Models 3 and 7 and
then the shares of deposit funding to total funding and non-interest income to total
income in Models 4 and 8. For each model variant, the coefficient on opacity remains
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The results suggest that a one
unit increase in opacity increases bank risk-taking by at least 1.2%. To put this into
perspective, the results in the fully specified models (Models 4 and 8) suggest that
a one standard deviation increase in opacity is associated with a 1.8–2.8% increase
in bank risk-taking. This finding is generally consistent with the evidence obtained
by Vallascas and Keasey (2013) on European banks: that bank default risk increases
with information asymmetry.
The coefficient on the Lerner index is negative in Models 3–4 and 7–8 in Table 4,
suggesting that banking competition increases bank risk-taking. Based on the results
in Models 4 and 8, a one standard deviation increase in competition (or decrease in
Lerner index) is associated with a 5.4–5.8% increase in risk-taking. This effect is
statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding is consistent with the evidence
in Beck et al. (2013) for a large cross-country study and Turk-Ariss (2009) for a large
sample of developing countries.
Turning our attention to bank business model and the other control variables,
we find that dependence on a large share of non-deposit funding makes banks more
risky, suggesting that the stabilising role of deposit funding outweighs any benefits
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derived from the monitoring role of non-deposit funding. Also, diversification into
non-interest income-generating activities leads to higher risk-taking. This finding is
largely consistent with DeYoung and Roland (2001) and Stiroh (2004a,b, 2006).
Bank provisioning for loan losses is positively associated with increased risk-
taking. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level across all models and is
consistent with the view that banks that face higher credit risk are less stable. We
also find, consistent with Beck et al. (2013), that bank size is negatively associated
with bank risk-taking, but this effect is statistically insignificant. Further, consistent
with Köhler (2015), banks with a larger share of loans in their asset composition have
lower risk-taking, suggesting that a focus on the traditional intermediation role of
banks leads to more stability in banking. However, the statistical significance of this
effect drops entirely once we control for competition, as well as funding structure and
income structure (Models 3–4 and 7–8). Finally, consistent with Beck et al. (2013),
the results suggest that increased expansion in assets is associated with increased
risk-taking.
5.1.1. Addressing potential endogeneity
In this section, we address any concerns about potential simultaneity between
opacity, competition and bank risk-taking. For instance, whilst opacity between in-
vestors and banks can lead to increased risk-taking incentives, the reverse can also
be true: the earnings of banks with higher risk-taking incentives could be difficult to
predict. Likewise, banks with higher risk-taking incentives could become less com-
petitive. To mitigate these concerns, we adopt the two-stage least squares (2SLS)
estimation approach to re-estimate Eq. (1). We follow the analysts’ forecast litera-
ture (e.g., Huyghebaert and Xu, 2016) and use analysts’ forecast horizon and earnings
surprise, as well as one period lagged value of opacity, as instruments for our opacity
measures.3 Whilst the existing literature provides compelling evidence that these
factors affect our measures of opacity, we believe that the factors should not have
any direct effect on bank risk-taking. Following Beck et al. (2013), we employ as our
instruments for competition cost-income ratio and lagged values of competition.
We report the results of the 2SLS estimation in Table 5. First, the Hansen
J-statistic p-values suggest that the instruments are valid. Also, a comparison of
the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic to the Stock-Yogo critical values rules out
weak instrument problems. In Models 1 and 5 of Table 5, we exclude competition,
3Forecast horizon is the number of calendar days between forecast announcement date and the
date of fiscal year-end for each bank in each year, whilst earnings surprise is the annual change in
earnings of each bank in each year scaled by the share price at the end of the fiscal year.
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funding structure and income structure variables from the estimation. We introduce
competition in Models 2 and 6, and again in Models 3 and 7 together with the
funding structure and income structure variable, but treat it as exogenous. The fully
specified models in which both opacity and competition are treated as endogenous
are presented in Models 4 and 8.
The coefficient estimates in Table 5 are similar to those in Table 4. Particularly,
the coefficient on opacity retains its negative sign and statistical significance at the
1% level, suggesting that opacity leads to increased risk-taking in banking, which
corroborates Hypothesis 1. In fact, based on the results in Models 4 and 8, a one
standard deviation increase in our measures of opacity is predicted to lead to a
4.8–5.8% increase in risk-taking. Also, the coefficient on the Lerner index remains
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This supports our earlier finding
that competition leads to higher risk-taking in banking. It is worth noting that the
coefficients on opacity and Lerner index are stable across models with and without
controlling for funding structure and income structure variables.
Thus, the findings in this section suggest that our earlier findings are unlikely to
be driven by simultaneity between opacity and bank risk-taking.
[Table 5 about here.]
5.1.2. Using alternative measures of risk
The results obtained thus far are based on accounting measure of overall bank
risk-taking or soundness. In this section, we assess the sensitivity of our results to
alternative measures of risk. We decompose the Z-score into risk-adjusted profit and
risk-adjusted capital and use them, together with the market measures of risk out-
lined in Section 4.1, as the dependent variables in Eq. (1). The results are presented
in Table 6. The results based on risk-adjusted profit are presented in Models 1 and
6. The coefficient on opacity remains negative and statistically significant at the 1%
level. The results thus support the positive relationship between opacity and bank
risk-taking, which is in line with Hypothesis 1. Likewise, the relationship between
competition and bank risk-taking remains negative and statistically significant at
the 1% level. We present the results based on risk-adjusted capital in Models 2 and
7. Again, the results confirm the positive relationship between opacity and bank
risk-taking on the one hand, and the positive relationship between competition and
bank risk-taking on the other hand.
[Table 6 about here.]
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The results in Models 3–5 and 8–10 are based on the market measures of risk.4 In
Models 3 and 8, we employ total risk as the dependent variable and confirm the pos-
itive relationship between opacity and bank risk-taking. The estimated coefficient
is statistically significant at the 1% level. Also, the positive effect of competition
on risk-taking is confirmed. Again, we find similar results in Models 4 and 9, where
idiosyncratic risk is used as the dependent variable. However, we find only weak sup-
port for the relationship between opacity and risk-taking when we employ systematic
risk in Models 5 and 10 as the relationship is only significant when we employ the
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts as the measure of opacity. Further, although con-
sistently signed, the relationship between competition and systematic risk is not
statistically significant.
On the effects of bank business model, we find that non-deposit funding re-
duces risk-adjusted profit (Models 1 and 6), whilst non-interest income generation
reduces risk-adjusted capital (Models 2 and 7). Contrary to our expectation, we
find a statistically significant negative relationship between non-deposit funding and
idiosyncratic risk (Models 4 and 8).
5.1.3. Pessimism, optimism and crisis
The efficiency of analysts’ forecasts may have a part to play in the way in which
bank risk-taking incentives respond to opacity. Analysts have a tendency to be sys-
tematically optimistic or pessimistic. As the former case could be incentive-driven
(Easterwood and Nutt, 1999), the forecast may be less informative and lead to a
greater need for market discipline. In the latter case, the caution with which an-
alysts generate forecasts may moderate the need for market discipline. Hence, we
expect bank risk-taking to be more sensitive to opacity for bank-year periods with
optimism than those with pessimism. We explore this conjecture by running separate
regressions for periods of analyst optimism and pessimism.
For each bank-year period, we define optimism (pessimism) as when the mean
analysts’ forecast is greater (less) than the actual earnings per share. We present
the results in Models 1–2 and 6–7 of Table 7. In Models 1 and 6, the coefficient
on the measures of opacity remains negative and statistically significant at the 1%
level. The point estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in opacity
is associated with a 2.3–3.7% increase in risk-taking under periods of optimism. We
do not find a similar relationship between opacity and risk-taking under pessimism
in Models 3 and 7.
4Consistent with Pathan (2009), we include the ratio of equity to total assets and market-to-book
ratio as additional control variables in these models.
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[Table 7 about here.]
Motivated by the belief that industry-wide distress may accentuate the effect of
opacity (Flannery et al., 2013), we test the robustness of our results to time periods
with differing levels of distress. Particularly, we run separate regressions for the
periods prior to, during and after the 2007-08 financial crisis. Specifically, we split
the sample period into Pre-crisis (1995–2006), Acute crisis (2007–2008) and Post-
crisis (2009-2013). The estimation results for each of these sub-periods are presented
in Models 3–5 and 8–10 of Table 7. The coefficient on opacity derived from analysts’
forecast error is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in the pre-crisis,
acute crisis and post-crisis periods. Likewise, the coefficient on opacity derived from
analysts’ forecast dispersion is negative but statistically insignificant for the post-
crisis period. This suggests that lessons from the crisis may have encouraged strong
monitoring of banks’ behaviour (Fosu et al., 2016). Also, the effect of opacity is
largest during the acute crisis period. Thus, the findings suggest that opacity drives
risk-taking in banking, especially during the crisis period, although the finding for
the post-crisis period needs to be treated with a fair amount of caution. Overall, the
findings confirm the positive association between opacity and bank risk-taking, again
corroborating Hypothesis 1, and are largely consistent with Vallascas and Keasey
(2013).
Again, the coefficient on the Lerner index is positive and statistically significant
at the 1% level across all models in Table 7. Competition increases bank risk-taking
in periods of optimism and pessimism, as well as in the periods prior to, during
and after the 2007-08 financial crisis. On the effect of bank business model, the
coefficient on share of non-deposit funding is negative and statistically significant for
all periods but the acute crisis and post-crisis periods. The findings suggest that the
monitoring role of non-deposit funding counterbalances the stability derived from
deposit funding during crisis and post-crisis periods. Further, diversifying into non-
interest income generation is associated with higher bank risk-taking during periods
of optimism and pre-crisis. This observation may be partly because of a greater need
for market discipline when optimism is higher and prior to crisis.
5.2. Information, competition, business model and risk-taking – interactions and ex-
tensions
As mooted in Section 1, the relationship between opacity and bank risk-taking is
likely to be non-linear. The same is true for the effects of competition and business
model on risk-taking. In Table 8, we present the results of Eq. (2), which captures
this non-linearity. We perform a battery of checks to ensure the robustness of our
results. In Models 1 and 7, we exclude the control variables in order to check the
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extent of influence exerted on the relationships of interest by the control variables.
We subsequently include the bank-specific control variables (in Models 2 and 8), as
well as the business model variables (in Models 3 and 9) and their interactions with
opacity (in Models 4–6 and 10–12).
The coefficient on the opacity proxies remains negative and significant at the 1%
level, whilst the coefficient on the interaction term between opacity and competition
is positive and also statistically significant at the 1% level. The findings suggest that,
whilst opacity leads to an increased risk-taking in banking on average, the effect is
moderated for banks with high market power. Equivalently, competition accentu-
ates banks’ opacity-driven risk-taking incentives, which is in line with Hypothesis
2. This finding is, however, inconsistent with our competition-transparency-stability
hypothesis, Hypothesis 3.
[Table 8 about here.]
In fact, the moderating role of competition in the relationship between opacity
and risk-taking is also economically significant. To make this clearer, in Table 9 we
present the marginal effects derived from applying Eq. (4) to Models 6 and 12 of
Table 8.5 In Panel 1 of Table 9, the marginal effect on risk-taking of opacity derived
from analysts’ forecast error is –0.012 at the 25th percentile of the Lerner index.
This effect reduces by 67% to –0.004 at the 75th percentile of the Lerner index. In
economic terms, this represents a 1.8 percentage point reduction in banks’ opacity-
induced risk-taking.6 The marginal effect of opacity derived from analysts’ forecasts
dispersion confirms this finding. The marginal effect is –0.014 at the 25th percentile
of the Lerner index but –0.003 at the 75th percentile, yielding a striking difference
of about 79%. In economic terms, this represents about a 1.5 percentage point
reduction per one standard deviation in the effect of opacity on bank risk-taking.
On the moderating role of business model in the opacity and risk-taking relation-
ship, we find only a weak accentuating role of non-deposit funding share. As shown
in Table 8, we first enter the interaction terms between the opacity and each of the
business model variables one at a time (Models 4–5 and 9–10). Each of these terms
enters the model with a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient. However,
5The marginal effects analysis based on the remaining models of Table 8 yields similar results
to those presented in here. We do not present them here for brevity and because Models 6 and 12
represent the fully specified model.
6We estimate economic effect as a product of the derived marginal effect and a one standard
deviation change in opacity (the variable of interest).
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when we include all the interaction terms simultaneously (Models 6 and 12), the in-
teraction between opacity derived from the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts (Model
12) and the share of non-deposit funding turns out to be statistically significant (at
the 10% level). Probing the joint significance of opacity and the share of non-deposit
funding, the results in Panel 2 of Table 9 show that the adverse effect of opacity
is only marginally accentuated by increased share of non-deposit funding. These
findings provide a weak level of support for Hypothesis 4.
Findings corollary to the aforementioned are that the risk-taking effects of compe-
tition and non-deposit funding increase with the level of opacity. As shown across all
models in Table 8, the coefficient on the Lerner index remains positive and statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level, as does the coefficient on its interaction with opacity.
Further, the analysis presented in Panel 3 of Table 9 shows that the marginal effect
of market power increases from 0.475 at the 25th to 0.544 at the 75th percentile of
opacity derived from analysts’ forecast error. For example, this implies that whole-
sale banks, which are opaque, have higher incentives for risk-taking and a greater
need for higher market discipline. A similar finding is obtained for the marginal ef-
fect of market power with respect to opacity derived from the dispersion of analysts’
forecasts, as shown in Panel 4 of Table 9: the marginal effect ranges between 0.535
and 0.618 at the 25th and the 75th percentiles of opacity, respectively. In economic
terms,these differences represent a significant 0.57–0.69 percentage point increase per
one standard deviation in the effect of market power (competition) on risk-taking.
Finally, the analysis in Panels 3 and 4 of Table 9 shows that opacity makes non-
deposit funding more detrimental to banking stability; however, this evidence is not
as economically significant and statistically robust.
[Table 9 about here.]
5.3. Robustness tests
We perform additional robustness tests to check the sensitivity of our results to
alternative calculations of Z-score and opacity. First, we re-estimate our baseline
and fully interacted models using Z-score where the standard deviation of returns is
computed over a five-year rolling window as in Beck et al. (2013). We present the
results in Table A1 in the appendix. Next, although we have used the most recent
analyst forecast in our measures of opacity to conform to the extant literature (e.g.,
Hong and Kubik, 2003; Anolli et al., 2014), we also acknowledge that later forecast
errors can be closer to actual earnings announcement and result in smaller forecast
errors (O’Brien, 1988); hence, we re-estimate our models again using an alternative
calculation of opacity where the first forecast for each period by each analyst is
employed. The results are presented in Table A2 in the appendix.
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Overall, these sets of results provide support for our main findings about the
impact of opacity on bank risk-taking.
6. Conclusion
Bank regulators place considerable emphasis on transparency with the expecta-
tion that it can help to instil discipline in the market, as reflected in the ongoing
architecture of Basel III. To this end, recent empirical attention has been drawn to
investigating the effects of opacity on risk-taking in banking. However, the exist-
ing literature has mainly focused on accounting measures of disclosure and liquidity.
In addition, the literature has not paid due attention to potential banking mar-
ket interactions, such as the role played by competition and bank business model.
Consequently, we seek to contribute to the existing literature by employing opacity
derived from analysts’ earnings forecasts. Our baseline conclusion is that opacity is
associated with increased risk-taking for US bank holding companies. This finding
is robust to different proxies for opacity and risk-taking. While the finding seems to
be mainly optimism-driven, it persists in the periods prior to, during and, to some
degree, after the 2007–08 global financial crisis. Further, we find that the effect of
opacity on bank risk-taking increases (decreases) with banking competition (market
power) and, to some extent, the share of non-deposit funding in total funding. We
do not find evidence in support of a greater need for market discipline in respect of
opaque diversified banks.
Our findings have some important policy implications. First, an increased disclo-
sure requirement is essential to attaining stability in competitive banking markets.
This is particularly true with the adoption of universal banking and the removal of
inter-state banking restrictions. Second, our findings may have some implications
for the ongoing debate relating to Basel III with regard to bank funding structure
and the role of market discipline.
Whilst our findings are significant and robust, the limitations of our study need
to be explicitly acknowledged. First, and similar to all archival studies of this na-
ture, our proxies may or may not capture actual opacity, competition, risk-taking
and business models in practice. Second, differences in regulations and monitoring
regimes across states may have implications for opacity, competition and risk-taking.
However, and due to lack of data currently, they have not been taken into account in
our models. Future research may improve our findings by accounting for differences
in the strength of state governance, regulatory and monitoring power in bank opacity,
competition and risk-taking. Finally, our study focuses on the US; more insights can
be gained by extending our analysis to a larger set of banks across different countries
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and over time, especially countries with different governance, regulatory, monitoring
and deposit insurance regimes.
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Figure 1
A scatter plot of detrended opacity and risk-taking.
This figure presents a scatter plot of detrended opacity, based on analysts’ earnings forecast error,
and risk-taking.
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Figure 2
A scatter plot of detrended opacity and risk-taking.
This figure presents a scatter plot of detrended opacity, based on dispersion of analysts’ earnings
forecast, and risk-taking.
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Table 1
Description of variables.
Variable Description
Z-score
Inverse measure of bank risk-taking, measured as the sum of bank
return on asset and equity-to-asset ratio divided by the standard
deviation of return on assets over the sample period.
Z-ROA Risk-adjusted profit, measured as bank return on asset divided bythe standard deviation of return on assets over the sample period.
Z-CAR
Risk-adjusted capital, measured as bank equity-to-asset ratio di-
vided by the standard deviation of return on assets over the sample
period.
TR Total risk, measured as the annual standard deviation of dailystock returns.
IDIOR Idiosyncratic risk, measured as the standard deviation of the errorterm from the market model, Eq. (9).
SYSR Systematic risk, measured as the beta (coefficient) from the marketmodel, Eq. (9).
Forecast error
Measure of opacity, measured as the absolute value of the dif-
ference between mean analysts’ forecasts and actual earnings per
share scaled by the share price at the end of the period.
Forecast dispersion
Alternative measure of opacity, measured as the standard devia-
tion of analysts’ forecasts for the fiscal year scaled by the share
price at the end of the year.
Lerner Lerner index, as a measure of competition at the bank level.
Non-deposit Proxy for bank business model in terms of funding structure, mea-sured as the ratio of non-deposit funding to total funding.
Non-interest
Alternative proxy for bank business model in terms of income
diversification, measured as the ratio of non-interest income to
total income.
Provision Credit risk measure, as the ratio of loan loss provisions to totalloans.
Size Bank size, the natural logarithm of each bank’s total assets.
Loans The ratio of bank loans to total assets.
Asset growth The annual growth rate of assets.
Equity Bank capital, measured as the ratio of equity to total assets.
Market-to-book The sum of market value of equity and book value of liabilitiesdivided by the book value of total assets.
This table presents the mnemonics of each variable and its respective description.
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Table 2
Summary statistics of all variables.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Z-score 33.689 52.857 0.011 1402.915 3525
Z-ROA 3.374 5.361 −3.619 117.227 3525
Z-CAR 30.315 47.809 1.385 1285.688 3525
TR 0.082 0.049 0.012 0.629 3513
IDIOR 0.07 0.043 0 0.448 3513
SYSR 0.743 0.766 −4.188 6.745 3513
Forecast error 1.252 2.296 0.017 9.44 3525
Forecast dispersion 0.932 1.415 0.046 5.619 3525
Lerner 0.27 0.083 0.095 0.418 3525
Non-deposit 0.183 0.104 0.041 0.416 3525
Non-interest 0.802 0.106 0.542 0.942 3525
Provision 0.006 0.006 0 0.024 3525
Size 15.434 1.487 13.454 18.797 3525
Loans 0.659 0.113 0.387 0.830 3525
Asset growth 0.101 0.111 −0.057 0.377 3283
Equity 0.092 0.021 0.06 0.136 3525
Market-to-book 1.068 0.069 0.956 1.216 3525
This table presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study. The sample comprises 402 US bank holding
companies over the period 1995-2013. All variables are as described in Table 1.
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Table 4
Opacity and bank risk-taking - fixed effect estimation.
Dependent variable: ln(Z-score)
Forecast Error Forecast Dispersion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Opacity −0.022∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Lerner 0.695∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.093) (0.088) (0.093)
Non-deposit −0.432∗∗∗ −0.420∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.104)
Non-interest −0.268∗∗∗ −0.273∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.094)
Provisions −4.449∗∗∗ −4.632∗∗∗ −4.751∗∗∗ −6.131∗∗∗ −5.845∗∗∗ −6.006∗∗∗
(1.023) (0.978) (0.961) (0.982) (0.946) (0.927)
Size 0.038 0.018 0.042 0.037 0.016 0.039
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026)
Loans 0.193∗∗ 0.119 0.069 0.179∗ 0.105 0.057
(0.095) (0.099) (0.100) (0.094) (0.098) (0.100)
Asset growth −0.146∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034)
Constant 3.037∗∗∗ 2.484∗∗∗ 2.654∗∗∗ 2.574∗∗∗ 3.038∗∗∗ 2.515∗∗∗ 2.684∗∗∗ 2.613∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.379) (0.390) (0.402) (0.016) (0.380) (0.393) (0.405)
Observations 3525 3283 3283 3283 3525 3283 3283 3283
Adjusted R2 0.195 0.230 0.280 0.302 0.171 0.213 0.272 0.293
Number of banks 402 402 402 402 402 402 402 402
This table shows the fixed-effect estimation results for the effect of opacity derived from analysts’ forecasts on banking
risk-taking. Time fixed effects are included in all estimations. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are in
parentheses. ∗∗∗ ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 5
Opacity and bank risk-taking – two-stage least squares estimation.
Dependent variable: ln(Z-score)
Forecast Error Forecast Dispersion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Opacity −0.034∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Lerner 0.606∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.101) (0.093) (0.101) (0.106) (0.097)
Non-deposit −0.438∗∗∗ −0.434∗∗∗ −0.439∗∗∗ −0.435∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.108) (0.105) (0.106)
Non-interest −0.247∗∗ −0.233∗∗ −0.235∗∗ −0.221∗∗
(0.100) (0.100) (0.098) (0.097)
Provisions −0.737 −2.440∗ −2.840∗∗ −2.937∗∗ −0.139 −2.116 −2.573∗ −2.643∗∗
(1.389) (1.362) (1.319) (1.280) (1.426) (1.401) (1.365) (1.327)
Size 0.033 0.016 0.040 0.036 0.026 0.012 0.036 0.033
(0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028)
Loans 0.215∗∗ 0.147 0.092 0.081 0.207∗∗ 0.143 0.087 0.077
(0.098) (0.100) (0.102) (0.103) (0.100) (0.101) (0.102) (0.103)
Assets growth −0.155∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038)
Observations 3092 3092 3092 3092 3092 3092 3092 3092
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.161 0.187 0.188 −0.036 0.107 0.138 0.142
Number of banks 402 402 402 402 402 402 402 402
Hansen J-statistic p-value 0.337 0.293 0.380 0.476 0.104 0.088 0.152 0.256
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat. 67.712 55.300 56.233 39.533 36.797 27.900 28.013 20.178
This table shows the two-stage least squares estimation results for the effect of opacity derived from analysts’ forecasts
on banking risk-taking. Asy is treated as endogenous in all Models. Lerner is treated as exogenous in Models 2, 3, 6
and 7 but as endogenous in Models 4 and 8. Time fixed effects are included in all estimations. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
∗∗∗ ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 6
Information asymmetry and bank risk-taking – alternative measures of risk.
Forecast Error Forecast Dispersion
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
ZROA ZCAR TR IDIOR SYSR ZROA ZCAR TR IdDIOR SYSR
Opacity −0.019∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.011 −0.019∗∗ −0.008∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗
(0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013)
Lerner 4.536∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗−0.718∗∗∗−0.765∗∗∗−0.353 4.551∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗−0.704∗∗∗−0.761∗∗∗−0.328
(0.271) (0.091) (0.113) (0.125) (0.275) (0.269) (0.090) (0.112) (0.122) (0.271)
Non-deposit 0.147 −0.521∗∗∗−0.207 −0.373∗∗ 0.117 0.150 −0.515∗∗∗−0.197 −0.367∗∗ 0.134
(0.133) (0.106) (0.141) (0.145) (0.360) (0.134) (0.105) (0.139) (0.144) (0.359)
Non-interest −0.737∗∗∗−0.146 −0.024 −0.112 0.182 −0.729∗∗∗−0.148 −0.038 −0.125 0.169
(0.200) (0.100) (0.125) (0.140) (0.263) (0.196) (0.099) (0.124) (0.139) (0.263)
Provisions −43.800∗∗∗−1.350 12.391∗∗∗ 12.489∗∗∗ 12.800∗∗∗ −44.676∗∗∗−1.991∗∗ 11.836∗∗∗ 12.212∗∗∗ 11.994∗∗∗
(3.196) (0.917) (1.635) (1.734) (3.647) (3.035) (0.876) (1.581) (1.693) (3.704)
Size −0.130∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗ −0.002 0.013 −0.053 −0.132∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.000 0.016 −0.052
(0.033) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.064) (0.033) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.065)
Loans −0.199 0.097 0.014 −0.075 0.038 −0.199 0.090 0.020 −0.065 0.037
(0.138) (0.107) (0.133) (0.134) (0.311) (0.139) (0.106) (0.131) (0.132) (0.311)
Asset growth −0.445∗∗∗−0.137∗∗∗−0.032 −0.012 −0.020 −0.456∗∗∗−0.140∗∗∗−0.014 0.007 −0.003
(0.056) (0.037) (0.055) (0.060) (0.145) (0.056) (0.036) (0.056) (0.061) (0.145)
Equity 0.256 0.509 −1.939 0.278 0.515 −1.900
(0.511) (0.505) (1.322) (0.503) (0.497) (1.306)
Market-to-book 0.422∗∗ 0.373∗ 0.211 0.472∗∗ 0.426∗∗ 0.262
(0.191) (0.201) (0.436) (0.190) (0.200) (0.437)
Constant 2.281∗∗∗ 2.260∗∗∗−3.077∗∗∗−3.342∗∗∗ 0.837 2.308∗∗∗ 2.281∗∗∗−3.176∗∗∗−3.455∗∗∗ 0.755
(0.517) (0.425) (0.503) (0.520) (1.213) (0.520) (0.426) (0.499) (0.515) (1.220)
Observations 3047 3283 3272 3272 2881 3047 3283 3272 3272 2881
Adjusted R2 0.652 0.287 0.610 0.557 0.245 0.650 0.284 0.613 0.560 0.246
Number of banks 401 402 402 402 401 401 402 402 402 401
This table shows the fixed effect estimation results for the effect of opacity on banking risk-taking. Time fixed effects are
included in all estimations. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ ∗∗ and ∗ indicate
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 7
Opacity and bank risk-taking – sub-sample analysis.
Dependent variable: ln(Z-score)
Forecast Error Forecast Dispersion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Opti- Pessi- Pre- Acute Post- Opti- Pessi- Pre- Acute Post-
mism mism crisis crisis crisis mism mism crisis crisis crisis
Opacity −0.016∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.010∗∗∗−0.016∗∗∗−0.012∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.009∗∗ −0.022∗∗ −0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004)
Lerner 0.635∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ 0.895∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.135) (0.130) (0.238) (0.120) (0.109) (0.136) (0.130) (0.231) (0.129)
Non-deposit −0.398∗∗∗−0.417∗∗∗ −0.535∗∗∗−0.235 −0.113 −0.365∗∗∗−0.416∗∗∗ −0.533∗∗∗−0.219 −0.060
(0.114) (0.145) (0.134) (0.302) (0.188) (0.115) (0.145) (0.134) (0.300) (0.193)
Non-interest −0.271∗∗ −0.152 −0.490∗∗∗ 0.509 −0.107 −0.318∗∗ −0.152 −0.498∗∗∗ 0.473 −0.014
(0.133) (0.121) (0.173) (0.577) (0.148) (0.134) (0.119) (0.173) (0.578) (0.155)
Provisions −3.533∗∗∗−6.517∗∗∗ −7.943∗∗∗ 0.834 −5.488∗∗∗ −5.624∗∗∗−6.601∗∗∗ −8.547∗∗∗−0.797 −7.141∗∗∗
(1.153) (1.457) (1.651) (3.047) (1.416) (1.114) (1.516) (1.583) (2.689) (1.424)
Size 0.024 0.053∗ 0.077∗∗ −0.166 −0.282∗∗∗ 0.021 0.053∗ 0.077∗∗ −0.234 −0.304∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.261) (0.080) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.252) (0.082)
Loans 0.131 −0.005 0.008 −0.587∗ 0.195 0.126 −0.005 −0.000 −0.636∗ 0.132
(0.118) (0.124) (0.128) (0.341) (0.157) (0.119) (0.124) (0.128) (0.351) (0.162)
Asset growth −0.110∗∗ −0.278∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗−0.150 −0.058 −0.110∗∗ −0.278∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗−0.146 −0.069
(0.048) (0.047) (0.041) (0.113) (0.060) (0.047) (0.046) (0.041) (0.119) (0.063)
Constant 2.704∗∗∗ 2.514∗∗∗ 2.219∗∗∗ 5.265 7.436∗∗∗ 2.762∗∗∗ 2.513∗∗∗ 2.225∗∗∗ 6.370 7.711∗∗∗
(0.488) (0.442) (0.485) (4.197) (1.261) (0.498) (0.442) (0.485) (4.050) (1.291)
Observations 1657 1626 2057 416 810 1657 1626 2057 416 810
Adjusted R2 0.301 0.344 0.260 0.260 0.422 0.285 0.344 0.257 0.255 0.398
χ2 35.84 30.34 15.19 9.27
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.026
Number of banks 375 374 355 230 213 375 374 355 230 213
This table shows the fixed effect estimation results for the effect of opacity derived from analysts’ forecasts on banking
risk-taking. Time fixed effects are included in all estimations. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are
in parentheses. χ2 indicates the Wald chi-square test statistics for the test of equality of the coefficients on opacity in
periods of optimism and pessimism as well as in pre-crisis, acute crisis and post-crisis. ∗∗∗ ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 9
Marginal effects of opacity, competition and business model.
25th% 50th% 75th% Change(25th–75%) Based on
Panel 1
Lerner index at: 0.219 0.271 0.325
Forecast error −0.012∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.008∗∗∗ Table 8, column 6
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Forecast dispersion −0.014∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗ −0.003 −0.011∗∗∗ Table 8, column 12
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Panel 2
Non-deposit funding at: 0.219 0.271 0.325
Forecast error −0.006∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ 0.004 Table 8, column 6
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Forecast dispersion −0.005 −0.008∗∗ −0.0012∗∗∗ 0.005 Table 8, column 12
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Panel 3
Forecast error at: 0.121 0.322 1.052
Lerner index 0.475∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ Table 8, column 6
(0.102) (0.100) (0.095) (0.018)
Non-deposit −0.390∗∗∗ −0.396∗∗∗ −0.414∗∗∗ 0.024 Table 8, column 6
(0.104) (0.103) (0.103) (0.017)
Panel 4
Forecast dispersion at: 0.138 0.335 0.965
Lerner index 0.535∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ Table 8, column 12
(0.107) (0.104) (0.097) (0.024)
Non-deposit −0.378∗∗∗ −0.387∗∗∗ −0.415∗∗∗ 0.037∗ Table 8, column 12
(0.105) (0.104) (0.103) (0.022)
This table shows the marginal effect analysis of the results presented in Table 8. Marginal effects are evaluated at
the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the interacted variable of interest (at the indicated values of Lerner index, non-
deposit funding, forecast error and forecast dispersion in panels 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively) holding other interacted
variables at their median values. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively.
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Appendix
Table A1
Information asymmetry and bank risk taking – alternative calculation of Z-score.
Dependent variable: ln(Z-score)
Forecast Error Forecast Dispersion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Opacity −0.017∗∗ −0.250∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.319∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.054) (0.016) (0.094)
Lerner 1.434∗∗∗ 1.153∗∗ 1.307∗∗∗ 0.972∗∗
(0.426) (0.475) (0.424) (0.469)
Opacity × Lerner 0.158∗∗ 0.227∗
(0.071) (0.122)
Non-deposit 0.104 0.110 0.071 0.107
(0.564) (0.560) (0.550) (0.553)
Non-interest −0.605 −1.101∗ −0.592 −0.979
(0.582) (0.599) (0.569) (0.613)
Opacity × Non-deposit −0.007 −0.003
(0.068) (0.118)
Opacity × Non-interest 0.248∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.099)
Constant 1.464 1.953 1.594 2.025
(1.765) (1.747) (1.719) (1.731)
Control variables Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 1868 1868 1868 1868
Adjusted R2 0.416 0.424 0.422 0.427
Number of banks 232.000 232.000 232.000 232.000
This table shows the fixed effect estimation results for the effect of opacity on banking risk-taking using
alternative calculation of Z-score, where the standard deviation of returns is calculated over a five-year
rolling window. Time fixed effects are included in all estimations. Robust standard errors clustered at
the bank level are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
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Table A2
Information asymmetry and bank risk taking – using first analyst forecasts.
Dependent variable: ln(Z-score)
Forecast Error Forecast Dispersion
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Opacity −0.012∗∗∗ −0.021 −0.012∗∗∗ −0.016
(0.002) (0.017)
Lerner 0.643∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.103) (0.092) (0.109)
Opacity × Lerner 0.074∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.029)
Non-deposit funding −0.428∗∗∗ −0.388∗∗∗ −0.416∗∗∗ −0.368∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.104) (0.103) (0.104)
Non-interest income −0.276∗∗∗ −0.214∗∗ −0.279∗∗∗ −0.215∗∗
(0.095) (0.102) (0.095) (0.104)
Opacity × Non-deposit −0.023 −0.045∗
(0.018) (0.027)
Opacity × Non-interest −0.004 −0.014
(0.018) (0.027)
Constant 2.593∗∗∗ 2.588∗∗∗ 2.650∗∗∗ 2.646∗∗∗
(0.403) (0.393) (0.406) (0.395)
Control variables Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 3277 3277 3277 3277
Adjusted R2 0.301 0.312 0.293 0.301
Number of banks 401.000 401.000 401.000 401.000
This table shows the fixed effect estimation results for the effect of opacity on banking risk-taking using
an alternative calculation of opacity where the first forecast for each period by each analyst is used. The
standard control variables, including forecast horizon, are included in these regressions. Time fixed effects
are included in all estimations. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are in parentheses. ∗∗∗
∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
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